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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Service by Publication
Insufficient for Condemnation of Local Resident's Property
By ROBERT L. VER SCHURE
Robert L. Ver Schure received his A.B. degree from Calvin College. He is a
student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Plaintiff, a Kansas resident, sued to enjoin the City of Hutchin-
son from taking his land following condemnation proceedings. The
complaint questioned the sufficiency of a statute' which allowed
notice of such proceedings to be given by publication in the official
city newspaper. Although the plaintiff was a resident of the munici-
pality, and his name was on the official city records, he never re-
ceived actual notice of the action until after the time for appeal had
expired. The Court declared the city's action unconstitutional, and
held that where a landowner is a resident of a state and his name is
known to the city and on its official records, mere newspaper pub-
lication of proceedings to condemn his property lacks the quality
of the notice required under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 77 Sup. Ct. 200 (1956).
The Walker case is not the first in which the Supreme Court has
considered the quality of notice sufficient to meet the requirements
of due process. In the 1888 case of Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry.,2 a sub-
stantially identical predecessor of the same Kansas statute' was
questioned by a plaintiff who was a non-resident and whose land
was correctly described in the published notice. The Court held that
under those circumstances the publication was sufficient to meet
the requirements of due process.
A 1924 case, North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman,4 involved
condemnation proceedings by the United States. Notice of the pro-
ceedings had been published in a city newspaper in compliance with
a Wyoming statute. 5 The landowner had actual notice of the pro-
ceedings before the time for appeal had expired, but instead of
appealing, he brought an action to enjoin the land company from
taking his property. In deciding that the statute met the require-
ments of due process, the Court said that although property may not
be taken without reasonable notice to the landowner, a statute does
not contravene the fourteenth amendment unless the property
owner is denied the fundamental right to be heard.
United States v. Winn,' a 1949 case, questioned a similar statute T
which allowed notice by publication of condemnation proceedings.
The statute permitted such notice if the landowners were unknown,
minors, or non-residents, and in cases where the owner refused for
any reason to convey. Although the land in question was properly
IKan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 26-202 (1949), provided that the commissioners were to give a land-
owner, "ten days notice in writing of the time and place when and where the damage will be
assessed, or by one publication in the official city newspaper . . ." This statute was amended in
1955 subsequent to filing of the Walker case, to require that after publication, the notice must be
mailed to the landowner unless his residence is unknown and cannot be ascertained. Id. § 26-202
(Supp. 1935).
'130 U.S. 559 (1888).
Kan. Camp. Laws art. 9, § 86 (1879).
4 268 U.S. 276 (1924).
'Wyo. Camp. Stat. Ann. § 2525 (1910).
S83 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.S.C. 1949).
'S.C. Code Ann. § 2046 (1942).
September-October, 1957
described, the landowner's name was not mentioned in the notice,
since no deed could be found conveying the land to him. It was held
that because the proceedings were in rem to acquire land for public
use, the statutory notice by publication was sufficient to meet the
requirements of due process.
Without a closer examination of the above mentioned cases
there would seem to be a direct conflict between them and the
Walker case. However, upon comparing their respective facts, it will
be observed that they can be reconciled. In the Huling case the land-
owner was not a resident of the state in which his property was
located. In such circumstances the practice of giving notice by pub-
lication is universally recognizedA The Court pointed out that the
statute allowing publication of notice rests upon the presumption
that since the landowner is outside the state and cannot be served
personally, a published notice, designed to attract the attention of
all, takes the place of personal service. A landowner should not be
allowed to escape the obligations which accompany the ownership
of property merely because he resides outside the state in which his
property lies. The "non-resident" situation found in Huling was ob-
viously lacking in Walker where the landowner resided in the mu-
nicipality.
The Winn case is readily distinguished from Walker in that the
landowner in the former was unknown to the public officials. Fur-
thermore, the plaintiff in the Winn case actually had seen the pub-
lished notice. Obviously, in Winn the only practical means of giving
noti6e was by publication, whereas in Walker the plaintiff was
known to the city through its official records.
In North Laramie Land Co. the landowner received actual no-
tice, but chose not to follow the normal procedure to protect his
interest. This situation did not exist in the Walker case where the
landowner had no actual notice of the proceedings until after the
appeal time had expired.
In deciding the Walker case the Court based its conclusion upon
Mullane v. Hanover Bank and Trust Co.9 There the defendant had
management of a common trust fund and petitioned for a settlement
to be binding on everyone having an interest in the common fund.
The -only notice of the settlement proceedings was by publication in
a local newspaper. The Court said that published notice to unknown
or non-resident beneficiaries would be allowed since it is the only
practical method of notification, but held that before depriving a
known person of substantial property rights personal notice must be
given. It should be observed that the facts in the Mullane case were
quite unlike those in Walker, in that the former dealt with settle-
ment of a trust fund. Trust actions are regarded by some courts as
actions in personam. 10 In any event, they lack the true in rem
character of condemnation proceedings.
.See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); Via v. State Commission, 9 F. Supp. 556 (D.C. 1935); Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 50-1-2 & 4 (1953)(allows publication only when the landowner is a non-resident or an
unknown, or for any reason ccnnot or will not consent to the taking of his property); Colo. R. Civ.
P. 4(g)(2)(i)(provides for publication when the landowner is unknown or a non-resident); Gwinner
v. Gary Connecting Rys.. 182 Ind. 553, 103 N.E. 794 (1914).
. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
10 Id. at 312; Freeman, Judgments §§ 1517-22 (5th ed. 1925).
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The practice of giving indirect notice in property actions is well
recognized. The authority to establish procedure for such notice
has been left to the state legislatures." This was emphasized by Mr.
Justice Burton's dissenting opinion in Walker where he stated that
such a notice provision is within the discretion of a state's law mak-
ing body.- He argued that to deny this state power or to declare its
exercise unconstitutional would be to fail to allow adequate scope
to local legislation.
In deciding the Walker case, the Court emphasized the impos-
sibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the type of published
notice that must be given. Plainly, the Court did not declare uncon-
stitutional all state statutes which allow notice by publication, nor
did they declare the Kansas statute generally unconstitutional.
Rather the Court pointed out that under certain circumstances in-
direct notification will not be allowed regardless of the character of
the action. Apparently the decision was based solely on the peculiar
facts and circumstances presented. Had the landowner received
actual notice and come into court only for the purpose of questioning
the sufficiency of the statute, the Court might well have decided that
he had no ground to complain.
u See note 8 supra.1 Wiqht v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371 (1901); In re New York, 99 N.Y. 569, 2 N.E. 642 (1885).
77 Sup. Ct. at 208 (1956)(dissenting opinion).
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